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“The jungle closed behind them like a tomb, and after hours of increasingly 
weary but also frenzied rowing through incomprehensibly labyrinthine salt-water 
channels overtowered by the cathedral-arching trees, Ayooba Shaheed Farooq were 
hopelessly lost; they turned time and again to the buddha, who pointed, ‘That way’, 
and then, ‘Down there’, but although they rowed feverishly, ignoring fatigde, it 
seems as if the possibility of ever leaving this place reduced before them like the 
lantern o f a ghost; until at length they rounded on their supposedly unfallible 
tracker, and perhaps saw some small light o f shame or relief glowing in his 
habitually milky-blue eyes; and now Farooq whispered in the sepulchral green­
ness of the forest: ‘You don’t know. You’re just saying anything’.” (MC, 360)'
The four characters of Rushdie’s M idnight’s Children are swallowed up by the 
jungle at the moment when the main protagonist Saleem Sinai alias the buddha 
has absorbed an overdose of history in the shape of the Pakistani civil war. What 
takes them in are the Sundarbans -  the jungle at the mouth of the river Ganges. 
The forest “which is so thick that history has hardly ever found the way in” (MC, 
359). The forest -  foris  -  the outside.2 The Sundarbans, the non-place.
Place is a familiar word which makes our life more focused. We carry it with 
us permanently and make use of it as we go along. With its help we make the 
world our own. A place is a space perceivable to our senses, it has its specific
1 Salman Rushdie, M idnight’s Children (London: Picador, 1982).
2 Jean-Franfois Lyotard, “Scapeland”, in The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. Benjamin (Oxford: Black- 
well, 1989), p. 215.
features: the way it looks, feels, smells. It also has some action(s) contained in 
itself (a church is a place of worship, a meadow is a place for a picnic, etc.) which 
makes it graspable to the mind. These give the place some relative stability and 
uniqueness when it comes to differentiation -  there are no two places alike. But 
with the change of scene this meaning of place may waver.
There is a desert: a stretch of sand or stones which unwinds indefinitely in 
all directions. Wherever you go the desert looks (and feels and sm ells...) the same. 
A place in the desert is like any other place in the desert. The circumstances inflict 
on the space the process of homogenization. But difference remains, even if it is 
only the matter of perspective: “here” and “there” are not just conjecture, they are 
not only illusory, they are grounded in the experience o f seeing.
The reference standard which makes a “desert place” possible is the horizon, 
the background against which the observer can measure himself and the objects 
o f his perceptions. The horizon “rectifies” the desert place, makes it obvious and 
divisible for the eye, reassures the grasp of spatiality.
Jungle presents itself differently in that respect. It closes upon the intruders. 
It grows: “The leaves in the heights o f the great nipa palms began to spread like 
immense green cupped hands, swelling in the nocturnal downpour until the entire 
forest seemed to be thatched” (MC , 361). The jungle is the incomprehensible tangle 
of vegetation where all places look the same and where all standards of measure 
are irretrievably lost. In its proper sense the jungle is not a place.
What is cut off by the cocoon of the jungle is not only the ruler o f the ho­
rizon. Two other standards, or rather a double-standard, cease to provide conscious­
ness with data, or at least their influence is vastly limited: neither the sun nor the 
moon can be counted on to regulate natural life. The measured time flows over 
its mould making its presence both more and less felt. All the creatures are either 
transparent or “almost entirely colourless owing to the absence o f direct sunlight” 
(MC, 362). And with that, time becomes more monochromatic too, moments that 
constitute periods of time get dangerously alike and indistinguishable. Time appears 
to lose its clockwise technological manageability, its density changes, the process 
o f congealing begins: “entire hours or days or weeks” pass “dissolving into each 
other” (MC, 361, 363).
“The jungle . . .  swallowed them the way a toad gulps down a mosquito”; it 
“closed behind them like a tomb” (MC, 360); the sojourn there is “the time of 
punishment” (MC, 363). The forest is unwelcome. Its unwieldiness estranges. It 
fills with remorse and apprehension which only deepen the feeling of being out- 
of-place. It threatens with its monstrosity, its boundlessness. The monstrosity of 
being completely other.3 Yet it is also a mirror where “flitting through the night- 
forest went the wraiths o f their hopes” and misdeeds “leading them by the hand
3 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Gesamtausgabe, Band 31 (Frank­
furt am Main: Klostermann, 1982), p. 135.
towards a new adulthood” (MC , 364) and where their bodies are unnarcisstically 
reflected in the stuff of the world around them. The monster and the mirror which 
make us see with both eyes create that way their own perspective. But does it not 
lead us back to the old Cartesian dychotomy? Not necessarily, the jungle puts 
forward a certain sleight of hand: we look into the imperfect, tainted mirror. Or 
even the purposefully curved one. The curved mirror which reflects a thing-as- 
other distorts the new perspective.4
Sight is founded on distance.5 It works properly only having established a safe 
space between the watching subject and the watched object, “objectification” of 
which has the sense of being looked at “disinterestedly” . This is the way a Renais­
sance painter looks at a thing: his disembodied I/eye watches through the 
window-like easel. The distance abstracts and tames. The curved mirror de- 
geometrizes space, makes it more tactile and introduces unhygenic proximity in 
the place of sterile distance: proximity as intimacy with monstrosity. It makes the 
eye myopic. Using Rushdie’s own metaphor:
Suppose yourself in a large cinem a, sitting at first in the back row, and gradually 
moving up, row by row, until your nose is alm ost pressed against the screen. Gradu­
ally the s tars’ faces dissolve into dancing grain; tiny details assume grotesque pro­
portions; the illusion dissolves -  or rather, it becomes clear that the illusion itself is 
reality . . .  (MC, 165-6).
When your nose is pressed against the screen the clear-cut shapes blur and 
things start to leak into each other. The safety of a perspective is forsaken and 
what one sees becomes actually absorbing'.
as they drank they fell deeper and deeper into the thraldom o f that livid green world, the 
jungle sucked it [them] in, and knew what they were like (MC, 362).
Yet its osmotic quality is only one side o f a double process because, at the 
same time, the viewer, to be able to see, must remain separate as well.6 What 
makes this double-bind possible is the m ind’s centrality as far as its world 
o f spacial relations is concerned: space neither “vanishes” nor is it radically 
“short-circuited” . It continues to exert its (however altered) influence but 
the world “changes it place”, it is no longer “out there” : the mind immersed 
in space becomes a starting point, a beginning zero o f spatiality of the world
4 Martin Jay, “Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and the Search for a New Ontology o f Sight”, in Moder­
nity and the Hegemony o f  Vision, ed. M. Levin (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University o f California 
Press, 1993), p. 170.
5 Hannah Arendt, The Life o f  the Mind'. Thinking (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1978), p. 111.
6 Maurice M erleau-Ponty, “The Eye and the M ind”, in The Primacy o f  Perception, trans. 
J. M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 162-3.
which is all around and not only in front o f the viewer. The eye turns its 
inside out.7
The changing status of vision is bound to influence our structures of tempo­
rality. The time o f numerical consecution, the time of calendar “before” and “after” 
is the time in which the eye made itself comfortable: the ineluctable spatiality of 
our everyday experience makes us think of the time in front of us and time behind 
us.8 These are the categories o f the disinterested eye. But with the collapse o f it 
the mind finds itself resting on the slippery footing of the present surrounded by 
time and, once again, being its own vantage point: it does not mean that the path 
leads nowhere, it means that the path is not a path at all. Spatial metaphors become 
of no use in the jungle: the curved mirror teaches the ego the art o f surrender -  
while still being palpable for itself it is overcome by the willingness to let things 
be. But can such a double gesture be accomplished? And what happens if over­
exposure takes place?
It is said that looking in a mirror long enough one is faced with the physi­
ognomy of the devil, the negative principle o f chaos, the formlessness of the 
universe. That looking incites the mind and puts its powers on edge. Exposure 
makes it feverish, overexposure makes it bum. Overexposure to the curved mirror 
incinerates the mind. The mind burns and in the ashes, the ashes of non-place, 
a new positive quality can be glimpsed: the landscape 9
Ever since Aristotle vision has been connected to form.10 In fact, production 
o f form was considered to be the only task o f vision. But there is always some­
thing un-formally unsettling in an object appearing this way: it makes itself 
contingent, there is some kind o f opacity ingrained in it. The object cannot lodge 
itself comfortably in the looking subject. Vision seems to desire reaching beyond 
form. But what if  “form simply is that which presents itself to vision, ‘allows itself 
to be seen’, how can there be vision which is not, somehow, of form? We seem 
to be trying to see nothing”." Is that nothing never to be seen? Does vision have 
to be blind to its own impossibilities? What is not seen can make its appearance 
just by being taken into consideration. The inside is always the image o f the outside 
and what we do not see has to be considered just for the reason that it influences 
our seeing, if for nothing else. Then the nothing is inevitably part of what we see 
and when the mind bums the only things that are left for us to see are the blind 
spots around which our vision has to organize itself.12
7 Ibid., p. 178.
8 Arendt, The Life o f  the Mind\ Thinking, pp. 205-6.
9 Lyotard, “Scapeland”, p. 212.
'“Aristotle, Metaphysics, 7.2.
" John McCumber, “Derrida and the Closure o f Vision”, in M odernity and the Hegemony o f  
Vision, p. 239.
12 Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, trans. G. C. Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1976), p. 163.
The incinerated mind reveals a landscape: a place with its destiny and des­
tination wiped clean. Forms that make a place consumable and domesticated are 
destroyed by the heat. What is left over then? (The landscape cannot be just 
“empty” -  it is not a form of negativity.) “That element in the datum which has 
no destiny”: matter.13 The landscape demonstrates the pure actuality of the world. 
What gets exposed is “an excess of presence”,14 the basic and evident unclean­
liness of the world. A glimpse o f untamed matter, landscape de-monstrates the 
world.
But the mind “never bums enough”, being as we are we always owe landscape 
a debt15: de-monstration never reaches the point o f assimilation. Materiality of the 
world can be revealed, but it can never be grasped. The blind spots must remain 
blind and blind as they are they constitute the very condition o f vision: that what 
consciousness does not see is, in fact, what makes it see.16 What constitutes the 
blind spot of consciousness in the presence o f the exhuberance o f the matter is 
its own corporeity. In the ashes of the mind this is the blind spot that remains, 
“an absence which stands as a sign o f a horrifying presence” 17 that cannot be 
investigated. Then it is not only in the sense o f being without destiny that the 
landscape blinds the eye; the innocent eye is indeed blind but its blindness has 
also a further meaning: the eye cannot see itself, it cannot turn upon its own 
materiality.
The jungle is a place where narratives are unwound: the narratives of the past 
that “flowed so freely that they seemed to be an aspect o f the monsoon” (A/C, 
364). They fill the ears. But how are they possible in the aftermath of the blinded 
vision? How is a description feasible in the world void of both topography and 
history? A tale cannot be told without a framework o f how, where and when. The 
problem is that the landscape’s power to dissolve seems not to allow a narrative 
to take place.18 Yet speaking happens as the afterburn o f the landscape experi­
ence. The stories are told as if  speech was the world’s inevitable quality, one of 
the ways o f its being present. As appearing in the world is the compelling need 
o f every creature, human beings seem to have the irresistible urge to speak in order 
to reveal what would otherwise remain hidden and invisible.19 What cannot be seen 
exposes itself to language.
13 Lyotard, “Scapeland”, p. 214.
14 Ibid., p. 216.
15 Ibid., p. 214.
16 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. C. Lefort, trans. A. Lingis (Evan­
ston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 248.
17 Lyotard, “Scapeland”, p. 217.
18 Ibid., p. 216.
19 Arendt, The Life o f  the M ind: Thinking, p. 98.
Language endeavours to unveil the area o f blindness, to make it present to the 
ear (then eye) and what cannot be seen finds its way into language. We are able 
to speak o f nothing; the invisibility is penetrated by the gift of language: it is 
metaphor that reaches forth. Using it with care we can accomplish an impossible 
translation, a carrying-over between two different existential modes. What cannot 
be seen can appear to the ear by means of similarity o f relations, by means of 
analogy.20 The invisible takes hold, however tentatively, of the domain of the senses.
The opposition between the landscape and the narrative is also the opposition 
between showing and telling. Or not the opposition maybe, but incongruity: 
showing and telling are two different tenses. But then is not this difference purely 
formal, operational? After all, it is the narrative that establishes a hold on time: 
it can make time pass, loop, fold upon itself, catch up with itself or even escape 
itself.21 A narrative takes time but what does time matter to the narrative?
Yet, in a sense, it does. No description o f landscape can make it present to 
the eye, language can never achieve a complete translation into vision. In descrip­
tion, language tries to be equal to, make do for the mind’s momentary absence. 
But, for obvious reasons, it is always too late for an accomplishment of this kind. 
And not only is it a matter of time -  the medium itself is “unwieldy” : words can 
never achieve the immobility and plenitude of blinding objects of contemplation. 
As words are always slippery and awkward, our debt to the landscape is never 
paid.22
20 Ibid., pp. 104-6.
21 Lyotard, “Scapeland”, p. 216.
22 Ibid., p. 217.
